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SEOV strains, 6 of which were from 
R. norvegicus rodents captured in ur-
ban areas of North Vietnam. Phyloge-
netic analysis showed that this SEOV 
belonged to the Vietnamese SEOV 
genotype (Figure).
We describe a clinical case of 
hantavirus infection and its potential 
rodent reservoir occurring in Vietnam. 
The clinical manifestations of the case-
patient were compatible with SEOV in-
fection, which is responsible for a mod-
erate form of HFRS (10). Also, HFRS 
caused by SEOV occurs in urban rather 
than rural areas, unlike other hantavirus 
infections. Our epidemiologic ﬁ  ndings 
were compatible with other studies 
indicating the source of infection was 
the case-patient’s home, the only place 
where she had a history of exposure to 
rodents. Although viral RNA could not 
be obtained from the case-patient for 
genotyping, the genomic comparison of 
the viral strains from rodents captured in 
the case-patient’s home and elsewhere 
in Vietnam suggested that the source of 
infection was local rodents. This report 
provides additional evidence that hanta-
virus infection is a worldwide problem 
and is likely underdiagnosed in Viet-
nam and other countries where simple 
standardized laboratory diagnostics are 
not widely available.  
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Origin of Highly 
Pathogenic Porcine 
Reproductive and 
Respiratory 
Syndrome Virus, 
China
To the Editor: A highly patho-
genic porcine reproductive and respi-
ratory syndrome virus (HP-PRRSV), 
which affected >2 million pigs, 
emerged in early 2006 in the People’s 
Republic of China. The disease was 
characterized by high fever (41°C), 
high illness rates (50%–100%), and 
high death rates (20%–100%) for 
pigs of all ages (1). A number of 
HP-PRRSVs have been isolated from 
2006 through 2009 from infected pigs 
in different provinces of China and 
conﬁ  rmed to be the causative agent 
of the new outbreaks (1,2). These 
HP-PRRSVs have a deletion of 30 
amino acids in nonstructural protein 
2 (NSP-2). However, the evolution-
ary origin and path of the HP-PRRSV 
remain unknown.
We analyzed the full-length 
sequences of 67 PRRSVs: 35 HP-
PRRSVs (HuN4 and LNSY-08-1 iso-
lated in our laboratory and 33 viruses 
isolated in other laboratories), 28 
classic PRRSVs (18 viruses isolated 
from China and 10 viruses represent-
ing other Asian countries and North 
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America), and 4 commercially avail-
able attenuated live PRRSV vaccine 
viruses. Except for the 2 viruses we 
isolated (HuN4 and LNSY-08-1), the 
full-length sequences of the other 65 
viruses were obtained from GenBank. 
Nucleotide and deduced amino acid 
sequences of these PRRSVs were 
aligned and compared by using previ-
ous methods (3,4).
Whole genome–based phylo-
genetic analysis showed that these 
67 PRRSVs could be divided into 4 
subgroups (online Appendix Figure, 
www.cdc.gov/EID/content/16/2/365-
appF.htm). Ten classic PRRSVs from 
China, together with the North Amer-
ican prototype virus VR-2332 and 
the vaccine virus RespPRRS/Repro 
modiﬁ  ed live vaccine, were classiﬁ  ed 
into subgroup 1. The ﬁ  rst  Chinese 
isolate, CH-1a, and its 3 derivatives 
(CH2002, CH2003, and CH2004) 
were classiﬁ  ed into subgroup 2. All 
35 HP-PRRSVs were classiﬁ  ed into 
subgroup 4, and they shared high 
homology (>99%) in their genom-
ic sequences. The other 4 Chinese 
PRRSVs, including HB-1(sh)/2002, 
HB-2(sh)/2002, Em2007, and SHB, 
belonged to subgroup 3, an interme-
diate subgroup between subgroups 2 
and 4. Phylogenetically, HP-PRRSVs 
had a close relationship with sub-
groups 2 and 3.
Four conserved deletions were 
shown among all HP-PRRSVs, includ-
ing an adenosine deletion at position 122 
in the 5′-untranslated region, a guanos-
ine deletion at position 15,278 in the 3′-
untranslated region, and 2 discontinu-
ous deletions in the NSP-2, including 
a single amino acid deletion at position 
482 (L482) and a second deletion of 29 
amino acids between positions 533 and 
561 (S533–A561). The presence of these 4 
deletions among subgroup 4 viruses is 
a unique phenomenon, which may be 
used as a distinctive molecular marker 
for HP-PRRSVs.
The occurrence of these 4 dele-
tions might be explained as a stepwise 
accumulation from subgroup 2 to sub-
group 4. None of the 4 deletions were 
found in subgroup 2. Among viruses 
in subgroup 3, one, 2, or 3 of the 4 
deletions occurred. For example, a 
single deletion was present at 122 nt 
in Em2007, double deletions at 122 nt 
and 15,278 nt in HB-1(sh)/2002 and 
SHB, and triple deletions at 122 nt, 
15,278 nt, and 482 aa in GD3-2005 
(this sequence was not submitted to 
GenBank until now). In 2008, Ma et 
al. compared GD3-2005 with several 
PRRSVs and reported the homology 
within them, pointing out that the 2 
deletions in NSP-2 were identical to 
the HP-PRRSV (5). After careful anal-
ysis, we found the GD3-2005 more 
interesting than what was reported by 
Ma et al.; it belongs to an intermediate 
group, and shares the characteristics 
of gradual evolution. Eventually, all 4 
deletions occurred in subgroup 4. This 
obvious pattern suggests that these 
4 conserved deletions might have 
evolved step by step.
The primary neutralizing epitope 
(PNE), which is located on glyco-
protein 5 and composed of the resi-
dues S37H(F/L)QLIYN with F/L39 as 
the binding site for the neutralizing 
antibody (6,7), also displayed simi-
lar changes at the 39 position among 
the 4 subgroups. The PNE residues 
in subgroups 1 (SHL39QLIYN) and 
2 (SHF39QLIYN) were considerably 
conservative. Subgroup 3 contained 
either F39 or I39 (F39 in Em2007 and 
HB-2(sh)/2002, and I39 in both HB-1-
(sh)/2002 and SHB); subgroup 4 con-
tained I39 only. The existence of either 
F39 or I39 in subgroup 3 PNE indicates 
its intermediate position between sub-
groups 2 and 4 in the evolution of HP-
PRRSVs.
Pairwise comparison of subgroups 
2, 3, and 4 did not ﬁ  nd recombina-
tion or large fragment replacement, 
which suggests that all HP-PRRSVs 
originated from the same ancestor by 
gradual evolution. Notably, the re-
cently isolated intermediate PRRSVs 
mentioned above (SHB, Em2007, 
and GD3-2005) were isolated in the 
region of South China where the out-
break of HP-PRRS initially occurred. 
Furthermore, the epidemiologic data 
show that the outbreak of HP-PRRSV 
emerged from 1 particular place and 
then spread widely. This evidence in-
dicates that all HP-PRRSVs isolated 
in China likely originated from the 
same source.
In summary, our ﬁ  ndings  sug-
gest that the newly emerged HP-
PRRSVs originated from the Chinese 
CH-1a-like PRRSV. Further study is 
needed to determine what contributes 
to the increased pathogenicity of HP-
PRRSV. Although the 4 deletions are 
conserved in all HP-PRRVs, the in-
creased pathogenicity of HP-PRRSV 
may not merely be caused by the de-
letions; pathogenicity is affected by 
multigenetic factors. 
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Evidence-based 
Tool for Triggering 
School Closures 
during Inﬂ  uenza 
Outbreaks
To the Editor: I read with inter-
est the recent article by Sasaki et al., 
“Evidence-based Tool for Triggering 
School Closures during Inﬂ  uenza Out-
breaks, Japan” (1), which describes an 
algorithm for determining the optimal 
timing of school closures to control 
inﬂ   uenza outbreaks. The published 
information is a helpful guide for pre-
dicting inﬂ  uenza outbreaks in school 
settings. However, no data are pre-
sented to show the efﬁ  cacy of school 
closures after the detection of such 
outbreaks. As such, the title “Evi-
dence-based Tool for Predicting Inﬂ  u-
enza Outbreaks, Japan” would more 
accurately describe the article.
The ﬁ  ndings presented by Sasaki 
et al. (1) could be used to help make 
a decision for school closure or dis-
missal in places like Japan, but no in-
formation is provided on whether this 
approach is effective in preventing fur-
ther inﬂ  uenza virus transmission. This 
is an important distinction and should 
not change the current school response 
guidance published by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) (2). In general, CDC guid-
ance suggests that during an inﬂ  uenza 
outbreak, policymakers should weigh 
the advantages and disadvantages of 
school dismissals or school closures 
before making a decision.
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In Response: Vogt (1) correctly 
points out that our article (2) did not 
present data on the effectiveness of 
school closures to control inﬂ  uenza 
outbreaks. However, public health 
agencies continue to support school 
closure as a nonpharmaceutical re-
sponse to the ongoing outbreak of pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 (3) despite little 
evidence for the appropriate timing of 
closures, even though it is known that 
timely action is critical. As the title of 
our article reﬂ  ects, our algorithm was 
designed as an evidence-based tool 
for supporting the timing of school 
closures.
In our article, we pointed out that 
evaluating the impact of school clo-
sures is a critical research question. 
Before April 2009, decision-making 
regarding school closure in Japan 
was left to individual schools, 98% of 
which are public. Since then, recom-
mendations for public school closure 
have been made according to standard-
ized rules set by the Japanese School 
Health and Safety Law, leaving ﬁ  nal 
decision-making authority up to local 
education boards. Our next study will 
evaluate the effectiveness of this early, 
standardized timing of school closure 
in Japan.
On September 24, 2009, the Japa-
nese Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare presented a school closure 
plan for use in the different stages 
of an inﬂ  uenza outbreak; the plan is 
based on World Health Organization 
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